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A major problem threatens Deleuze’s project in The Logic of Sense. He makes an ontological 
distinction between events and substances, but he then collapses a crucial distinction between 
two kinds of events, namely, actions and mere occurrences. Indeed, whereas actions are 
commonly differentiated from mere occurrences with reference to their causal dependence on 
the intentions of their agents, Deleuze asserts a strict ontological distinction between the 
realm of causes (including psychological causes) and the realm of events, and holds that 
events of all types are incorporeal happenings which are inseparable from expressed sense. 
For Deleuze, what counts as one’s action thus does not depend on one’s intention, but rather 
on a process of “making sense” of that action. Nevertheless, Deleuze continues to speak of 
the need to “will” the event. In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, I will read a 








“Willing the Event”: Expressive Agency in Deleuze’s 
Logic of Sense 
 
 
A major problem appears to threaten Deleuze’s project in The Logic of Sense.1 He rightly 
makes an ontological distinction between events and substances, happenings and fixed things. 
However, he appears to collapse a crucial distinction – one he makes elsewhere2 – between 
two kinds of events or happenings: actions and mere occurrences. Whereas actions are 
commonly differentiated from mere occurrences with reference to their causal dependence on 
the prior intentions or willing of agents, Deleuze asserts a strict ontological distinction 
between the realm of causes (including psychological causes) and the realm of events, and 
holds that events of all types are impassive, impersonal and incorporeal happenings which are 
inseparable from expressed sense. This means that what counts as one’s action does not 
depend on one’s intentions or willing; it rather depends on an impersonal process of “making 
sense” of that action. Nevertheless, Deleuze continues to speak of the need to “will” the event 
and take personal responsibility for what happens. In order to resolve this apparent 
contradiction, I propose to read a conception of “expressive agency” into The Logic of Sense. 
This conception would allow Deleuze to retain the category of intentions or willings as a 
means to distinguish actions from mere occurrences, but it would also understand them in 
                                                 
1 G. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, M. Lester with C. Stivale (trans.), C. V. Boundas (ed.) (New York: Colombia 
University Press, 1990). 
2 See, for example, G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (London: Athlone, 1993), 41: ‘an event is 
called what happens to the thing, whether it undergoes the event or makes it happen’. 
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properly Deleuzian terms as the “effects” of an expressive “sense-event”, and not as the 
psychological causes of action. 
 
Before outlining in more detail the problem of action and agency in The Logic of Sense and 
advancing a solution, two brief remarks are in order. First of all, this essay focuses 
exclusively on The Logic of Sense. It does not seek to resolve the problem of action and 
agency in this text with reference to Deleuze’s other works, and for two reasons. The first 
reason is that, despite the synthetic approach often taken in Deleuze scholarship, it is not at 
all clear that Deleuze’s texts conceptually harmonize with one another in such a way as to 
easily allow for this type of move. Deleuze himself indicates the difficulty in his “Note for 
the Italian Edition of The Logic of Sense”. He explains that, from Difference and Repetition 
to The Logic of Sense to Anti-Oedipus, not only do the technical terms which reappear in 
these different texts signify different philosophical concepts, the problems addressed, the 
methods employed, the subject matter and the theoretical allegiances also differ from one text 
to another.3 Of course, this is not to say that inter-textual studies of Deleuze’s approaches to 
issues such as action and agency cannot be undertaken. It is simply to say that they cannot be 
carried out without taking these wider transformations into account and acknowledging that 
even though different texts might address the same abstract issue, it does not necessarily 
follow that they address that issue in convergent ways. The second reason why this essay 
does not appeal to Deleuze’s other texts is that these works (that is to say, his major works, as 
opposed to his historical studies) are self-contained, systematic works of philosophy. In other 
words, in relation to a particular problem or set of problems (difference and repetition, sense 
                                                 
3 G. Deleuze, “Note for the Italian Edition of The Logic of Sense”, in Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and 
Interviews 1975-1995, A. Hodges and M. Taormina (trans.), D. Lapoujade (ed.), 63-6 (New York: Semiotext(e), 
2007), 65-6. 
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and events, desire and politics, etc.), each of Deleuze’s major works advances a novel set of 
interrelated and inter-defined concepts which allows him to make interesting contributions to 
the major branches of philosophy: ontology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of language, 
political philosophy, and so on. We should thus expect that each text contains its own 
resources for understanding its various elements and resolving its internal tensions, even if 
these resources remain implicit or relatively underdeveloped. Indeed, I will demonstrate in 
Section 3 of this essay that The Logic of Sense already implicitly contains the conception of 
expressive agency that I advance in Section 2, as a response to the problem of action and 
agency identified in Section 1. 
 
The second preliminary remark that needs to be made is that this essay does not deal with 
much of the excellent literature exploring Deleuze’s approach to action and agency.4 The 
reason for this is that many of these texts either do not deal with The Logic of Sense, or else 
they tend to run together Deleuze’s thinking about action and agency in The Logic of Sense 
with his thinking about these issues in other works. And as I have just suggested, this is, if 
not an illegitimate move, perhaps overhasty, at least insofar as the attempt has not first been 
made to treat The Logic of Sense’s approach to these issues in terms which are proper to that 
text alone. 
 
Preliminaries aside, I will now detail the difficulties involved in conceptualizing action and 
agency in terms of the philosophy of events advanced in The Logic of Sense. I will then 
                                                 
4 See, for example, S. Bignall, Postcolonial Agency: Critique and Constructivism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010) and B. Massumi, Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts 
(Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2011). These two works explore Deleuzian approaches to action and agency 
in the political and aesthetic spheres. 
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outline an account of action and agency that resolves these difficulties before demonstrating 
that such a conception is nascent or already implicit in The Logic of Sense, and needs only to 
be made explicit. 
 
1. Actions and events in The Logic of Sense 
 
Two kinds of events, two kinds of things that happen, are commonly distinguished: actions 
and mere occurrences. Whereas mere occurrences are events which are passively undergone 
(so, metal corroding or ice melting are events of this type), actions are events that are actively 
done (such as my waving a greeting to someone, putting on my shoes in order to go for a 
walk, or swearing an oath). Actions, it is commonly held, are the intentional doings of some 
agent. 
 
Indeed, it seems important to distinguish between these two types of event – actions and mere 
occurrences. Some events we cannot make sense of unless we have reference to intentions. In 
particular, the physical movements of persons only make sense for us insofar as we can 
distinguish in each case between what is intentionally done and what is passively undergone. 
As in the well-known example, the category of intentions is what allows us to distinguish 
between somebody’s arm merely “going up” and somebody raising their arm, for instance, to 
vote at a committee meeting.5 And of course, it is extremely important in moral and legal 
contexts that we have reference to, and discriminate between, what persons intentionally do 
                                                 
5 The example comes from L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (PI), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), 
G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), §621: “what is left over if I subtract the fact 
that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?” 
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and what they passively undergo. Only in this way can we appropriately assign moral and 
legal responsibility for what happens. 
 
In speaking here of intentions, I am only really concerned to capture, in very general terms, a 
common way of conceiving of action, that is, with reference to certain types of causes. On 
this common conception of action, an action is an event which is brought about by a prior, 
psychological cause, which is the intention of the agent (or the desire of the agent, a 
combination of desire and some beliefs about the means to achieve that desire, a decision to 
act for some purpose, a willing of some end, etc.).6 Actions, then, are distinguished from 
other kinds of events – mere occurrences – insofar they are brought on by prior psychological 
causes. And these prior psychological causes are held to be the individuating principle of 
those actions being the particular actions they are. 
 
In The Logic of Sense, however, Deleuze challenges this conception of action whereby action 
is both explained and distinguished as a type of event (distinct from a mere occurrence), with 
reference to its causal dependence on a prior psychological state or intention that somehow 
brings it about. Deleuze claims to follow the Stoics in asserting an ontological distinction 
between: on the one hand, the realm of bodies in general with their relative, causal activity 
and passivity, and their particular physical, biological and even psychological states; and on 
the other hand, the realm of “what happens” – the realm of events in general – which are 
uniformly characterized as impassive, incorporeal and impersonal happenings.7 For Deleuze, 
                                                 
6 For this general approach to action, see D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 
60(23) (1973), 685-700. 
7 On events as incorporeal and impassive, see Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 4-5; on events as impersonal, see 148 
and 151. 
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as distinct from corporeal things, events are incorporeal and exist only as the expressed or 
expressible sense of propositions.8 
 
Three points bear mentioning here for the purposes of clarification. The first is a 
terminological one. When Deleuze speaks in The Logic of Sense of the causal order and the 
actions and passions of bodies therein, he is not talking about the two kinds of events we have 
been discussing: actions and mere occurrences. For Deleuze, what happens – an event – is 
never of the same nature as, and is not reducible to, the actions and passions of bodies. These 
latter notions simply pick out general characteristics of bodies situated in a causal order 
relative to one another. An active body is a body that, human or not, brings about something 
for another body, and the passion of a body refers to the action of a more powerful body.9 
Events, on the other hand, are impassive, incorporeal and impersonal. 
 
The second point follows from the first. For Deleuze, events never belong to the same 
ontological register as any of the causal antecedents – whether psychological causes or the 
physical states of brains on which these are often thought to supervene – by means of which 
we normally distinguish between types of event, that is, between actions and mere 
occurrences. 
 
The third and final point we need to make here is that Deleuze appears to collapse the 
distinction between actions and mere occurrences, because events of both kinds are only ever 
impassive happenings. Activity and passivity are the characteristics of bodies situated in a 
                                                 
8 See Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 12, 21-2 and 181. 
9 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 163. 
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corporeal, causal order relative to one another. Events, on the other hand, are impassive and 
incorporeal.10 
 
What exactly does it mean to say that events are impassive, incorporeal and impersonal? For 
Deleuze, it has something to do with the relation between events and sense. As he asserts in a 
number of places, events in general exist only as the expressed or expressible sense of 
propositions bearing on “what happens” in general.11 He even goes so far as to say that the 
event is sense itself.12 His argument for the inseparability of events and expressed sense is 
complex, but it can be summarized in the following way.13 As has already been said, Deleuze 
follows the Stoics in asserting an ontological distinction between the realm of bodies and 
causes and the realm of events. He also follows the Stoics in claiming that bodies are causes 
to one another of everything that happens, but what happens – the effect or event – is a 
proposition or propositional item (Stoic lekta), which is to say, something that is true of the 
                                                 
10 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 5. 
11 Consider the following citations from The Logic of Sense: “It is characteristic of events to be expressed or 
expressible, uttered or utterable, in propositions which are at least possible” (12); “sense … does not exist 
outside the proposition which expresses it” ( 21); “the event is sense itself … [it] belongs essentially to 
language; it has an essential relationship to language” (22); “the event does belong to language, and haunts it so 
much that it does not exist outside of the propositions which express it” (181). 
12 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 22 and 167. 
13 For a detailed account of the relation between sense and events, see S. Bowden, The Priority of Events: 
Deleuze’s Logic of Sense (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). This relation has also been explored 
in detail in J.-J. Lecercle, Deleuze and Language (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 99-131; N. Widder, 
Reflections on Time and Politics (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2008), 108-14; and 
J. Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2008), 28-76. 
 9
bodies the proposition denotes.14 The proposition, however, envelops its own internal 
division.15 On the one hand, it denotes a state of affairs; on the other hand it expresses a sense 
– sense being, in Frege’s terms, the “mode of presentation” of the referent, or as Deleuze puts 
it, the “condition of truth”.16 But the sense expressed by a proposition is not compresent with 
that proposition. Sense must be distinguished from any actual spoken or written utterance, 
because no utterance says its own sense.17 Deleuze also argues that the sense of a proposition 
cannot be located in those relations which are normally invoked to explain sense. Sense must 
thus be distinguished from the relation of denotation between the proposition and objective 
states of affairs; the relation of the proposition to a person’s beliefs and desires; and the 
relation of the proposition to general concepts and their conceptual implications within a 
fixed conceptual scheme.18 Following Deleuze, a proposition denoting a state of affairs 
expresses a sense, but this sense can only be explicitly stated by a second proposition whose 
sense, in turn, can only be stated by a third proposition, and so on indefinitely.19 In other 
words, the event exists as the sense of the proposition bearing on what happens, but this sense 
must be produced by constantly bringing language to bear on itself, and even by creating new 
means of expression. Moreover, as Deleuze makes clear in his references to psychoanalytic 
theory, sense is always being produced in this way in an “intersubjective” or social space – a 
social space which is irreducible to any particular group or collective functioning as the 
                                                 
14 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 4-5. On this topic in the Stoics, see also M. Frede, “The Original Notion of Cause”, 
in Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 135-8. 
15 See on this, Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 25. 
16 G. Frege, “On Sinn and Bedeutung”, in The Frege Reader, M. Beaney (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1997), p. 152; and Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 18-19. 
17 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 28-9. 
18 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 12-22. 
19 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 28-9. 
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ultimate arbiter of meaning (conventionalism).20 This is why the event is said to be 
impassive, incorporeal and impersonal. It results from an on-going and open-ended process of 
making sense both of what happens and what is said about what happens. The event is thus 
sense itself: a “sense-event”.21 And this “sense-event” is ontologically distinct from, and 
irreducible to, the activity and passivity of bodies located in the corporeal, causal order. 
 
But now, in relation to the category of action, this ontological divide between the causal 
realm of bodies and the incorporeal realm of events gives rise to the counter-intuitive thought 
that my action does not depend for its determinateness on my prior willing or intention to do 
that thing. Or again, my action does not depend for its determinateness on my prior 
psychological state acting as its cause and individuating principle. Rather, my action is a type 
of event, and its determination is inseparable from the open-ended expression of the “sense” 
of what I do. 
 
But in fact, the experience of a kind of “gap” between my prior intention or psychological 
state and the determinate nature of my action is familiar to us from experience. It is the 
experience of coming to realize that my action is not in agreement with what I thought was 
my intention: this intention which, on the ordinary view, is supposed to be the cause and 
individuating principle of my action’s being the determined happening it is. So, for example, 
let us say that one morning I go outside with the intention, of which I am vaguely aware, of 
playing fetch with my dog and giving her some much needed exercise. In playing with her I 
                                                 
20 The structural, symbolic and intersubjective dimension of language and culture has an indispensable role to 
play in Deleuze’s account (couched in a psychoanalytic vocabulary) of the “dynamic genesis” of sense and the 
event. See Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 186-233. 
21 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 22. 
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find myself vocally correcting her when she does not bring the ball right back to my feet, or 
when she pauses to sniff something, or chase her tail, before picking up the ball to bring it 
back to me. Let us now say that my wife sees this happening and wants to know why I do not 
just play with the dog and give her some exercise. Why am I training the dog? Teaching her 
to be obedient? Establishing my position as the dominant member of her human pack, or 
whatever dog whisperers are constantly telling dog owners to do? Now, I am initially 
surprised by my wife’s reactions and questions because, as I said, my intention, of which I 
had a vague conscious awareness, was simply and precisely to play with the dog and tire her 
out. But then, in my discussion with my wife, I come to realize that what I am really doing 
(and so what I really wanted to do) in no way resembles my original conscious intention – the 
intention which, on the ordinary view of things, is supposed to be both the cause of my action 
and its individuating principle. In an odd way, it appears that my action is transformed by 
articulating it, by making sense of it, in an intersubjective context. To take up an important 
concept in The Logic of Sense, perhaps we could call this open-ended process of making 
sense of what happens the “quasi-cause” of the event, which is distinct from the kind of 
causality which is at work in the corporeal order and irreducible to it. 
 
In any case, the question now arises: given that what counts as my action does not entirely 
depend on my prior, conscious intention functioning as the cause of my action, can I be 
responsible for what I do? Can I be responsible for what I do if I do not know – or do not yet 
know – exactly what it is I am doing? Is the action even “mine”? It would appear that, in 
cases like the above where I do not have a clear understanding of exactly what it is I am 
doing, I can nevertheless take responsibility and be held responsible for what my action turns 
out to be. Practically speaking, I and others simply affirm that doing as mine, or affirm me as 
the agent of what was done, even apart from any considerations related to moral 
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responsibility. But in what is this affirmation grounded if agent-responsibility cannot be 
understood in purely causal terms? 
 
This being the subject of the present study, we can remark that Deleuze in no way dismisses 
the ideas of agency and personal responsibility for what happens, despite treating actions as 
impassive and impersonal events which are inseparable from expressible sense and 
irreducible to physical and psychological causes. Indeed, for Deleuze, we have to “become 
worthy” of the event, and he is highly critical of the attitudes of resignation and ressentiment 
in the face of the sense-event.22 Moreover, in the “Twenty-First Series of the Event”, Deleuze 
advances a conception of “willing the event”.23 The very notion of “willing the event”, of 
course, appears inconsistent with Deleuze’s understanding of events as incorporeal. But the 
contradiction is only apparent. For Deleuze, “willing the event”, in the case of an action-
event, will not consist in causing some particular, intended action, clearly conceived of prior 
to the act. It will rather consist in willing the “sense-event” from which our determined 
actions are inseparable, but where this sense-event also creates in us our willing. As Deleuze 
explains, as opposed to a corporeal or “organic will” there is a type of “spiritual will” which 
 
wills now not exactly what occurs, but something in that which occurs, something yet 
to come which would be consistent with what occurs ... : the Event ... The event is not 
                                                 
22 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 149 and 152. 
23 See Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 148-50. The primary focus in this series is on willing and taking responsibility 
for events that happen to us, as opposed to willing and taking responsibility for what we actively do. But as we 
are arguing, if they are incorporeal, impassive and impersonal events inseparable from expressed or expressible 
sense, our determinate actions will be, at least from a certain point of view, things that happen to us. 
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what occurs (an accident),  it is rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed ... [I]t 
is what must be understood, willed and represented in that which occurs.24 
 
Furthermore, for Deleuze, this spiritual will does not pre-exist the event and its expression. 
The event and its expression rather determine the will (retrospectively, as will be seen): 
 
It is a question of attaining this will that the event creates in us; of becoming the 
quasi-cause of what is produced within us.25 
 
A full explication of these and related passages is obviously required. Before coming to this, 
however, it will first of all be helpful to step outside the complex language and textual 
machinery of The Logic of Sense and attempt clarify what Deleuze might mean by “willing 
the event” when the kind of event at issue is an action. I will do so with reference to the idea 
of “expressive agency”. The account I will offer is inspired by, but does not duplicate, the 
work of Charles Taylor on expressive agency.26 It also bears some similarity to elements of 
Robert Pippin’s work on Hegel’s philosophy of action, as well as to his study of Nietzsche’s 
famous claim in the Genealogy of Morals that “there is no doer behind the deed” and that 
“the deed is everything”.27 
                                                 
24 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 149. 
25 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 148. 
26 See in particular C. Taylor’s “Action as Expression”, in C. Diamond and J. Teichmann (eds) Intention and 
Intentionality: Essays in Honor of G. E. M. Anscombe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 73-89; “Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Mind”, in Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 77-96; 
and Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
27 See R. B. Pippin’s Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); and “Agent and Deed in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals”, in K. Ansell-Pearson (ed.) 
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2. An account of expressive agency 
 
My account of expressive agency involves four essential claims: 
i) While the agent with her intentions can no longer be thought to be behind her actions 
in the traditional causal sense, she is certainly “out there” in her actions such as these 
are interpreted or made sense of by others.28 
ii) While the actions of agents are multiply interpretable by others, these others are 
themselves “out there” in their multiply-interpretable actions. 
iii) An action will count as being the action of a particular agent insofar as both this 
agent, and other agents, are able to recognize her in that action. 
iv) These multiple interpretations and recognitive processes take place in a shared 
expressive medium or language which is not already given or fixed but is always 
being produced. 
Taking these four claims together, we will see that an action will count as mine – both in my 
eyes and in the eyes of others – insofar as my willing it is coordinate with my willing that in 
                                                                                                                                                        
A Companion to Nietzsche (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 371-86. Robert Brandom has developed a related study of 
Hegel’s “expressive metaphysics of agency” in his as-yet unpublished A Spirit of Trust, Ch. 7, available in draft 
form on his personal website: http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/hegel/index.html. Aaron Ridley and David Owen, 
building on Pippin’s work on Nietzsche, have also developed impressive studies of Nietzsche’s expressive 
understanding of agency. See, for example, A. Ridley, “Nietzsche’s Intentions: What the Sovereign Individual 
Promises”, in K. Gemes and S. May (eds) Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 181-95; and D. Owen, “Autonomy, Self-Respect, and Self-Love: Nietzsche on Ethical Agency”, in 
Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, 196-222. 
28 By “interpretation” of an action, nothing more is meant than that an action is “presented” in a particular but 
contingent way by means of a proposition that can be made sense of by others. 
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which all actions (including interpretative action) will be made sense of as determined 
happenings attributable to specific agents. That is to say that an action will count as mine – 
both in my eyes and in the eyes of others – insofar as my willing it is coordinate with my 
willing the sense-event taking place in our shared expressive medium. 
 
Before we can understand this conclusion, we must examine the above four claims more 
closely. The first claim was that whilst the agent with her intentions can no longer be thought 
to be behind her actions in the traditional sense, she is certainly “out there” in her actions. 
Initially, this looks like the well-known expressivist claim that an agent’s intention is both 
revealed in, and inseparable from, what he or she effectively does. In other words, what an 
agent actually does in the external world expresses his or her inner intention in the strong 
sense that the intention does not have any reality apart from its embodiment in concrete 
action(s).29 Indeed, somebody’s failure to act to fulfil a stated intention when they have the 
means and opportunity to do so gives us the strongest possible reason for denying the reality 
of that intention, no matter how strongly the person in question might protest. For example, if 
I state an intention to leave work in time to be home by 7pm but end up working until 7.30pm 
for no extra-ordinary reason, neglecting in the process my opportunity to catch an early bus 
home, this is clear evidence that I did not “really” intend to be home by 7pm. 
 
But we will also need to add to this expressivist position the Deleuzian claim that an action, 
as a type of event, itself does not have any reality outside of its expression in propositions. 
We might say that the agent with her intentions is thus not so much behind her actions as in 
her actions as made sense of or interpreted. And this is clear from the example given several 
paragraphs above: the view of me as an agent wanting to discipline my dog is not to be 
                                                 
29 On this point, see Taylor, “Action as Expression”. 
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derived from my earlier conscious intention acting as a direct cause of my action (indeed, the 
intention of which I was aware was only to play with my dog and give her some exercise). 
The view of me as an agent wanting to discipline my dog is rather derived from an 
interpretation of what I was doing, which was carried out in an intersubjective and linguistic 
context, and which the parties involved (including myself) came to recognize as being my act. 
Again, in this case, I am not so much behind my actions as in my actions as interpreted. 
 
The second claim involved in our account of expressive agency is that the actions of agents 
are multiply interpretable by other actors who are themselves “out there” in their multiply-
interpretable actions. The idea here is that the action in which I, as an actor, have my being, 
really takes place at several levels, or is inseparable from a number of related actions. On a 
first level, we have the action that I am doing, whatever this will be determined as being. On 
a second level, we have the action of interpreting, articulating and even contesting the nature 
of this action on the first level. And finally, on a third level, we have the series of 
interpretable actions which “will have determined” the authority of those persons (including 
myself) doing the interpreting of my action on the second level, and the seriousness of their 
interpretations. This last point seems important, for it is clear that not everybody will be 
recognized as having either the normative or de facto capacity to contribute to the 
determination of the sense of my action. Indeed, it may even be that I lack this normative or 
de facto capacity to contribute to the determination of the sense of my own action. In short, 
the interpretation of my action will be inseparable from the interpretation of series of actions 
– interpretative or otherwise – characterizing those doing the interpreting. 
 
To illustrate this point, let us say that I have gone into my backyard with the intention of 
playing fetch with my dog and so exercising her. I correct my dog’s mistakes, raise my voice 
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at her, and so on, as before. My neighbour looks over the fence and says a few choice words, 
from which I am given to understand that he thinks I am a contemptible individual who is 
bullying his dog. Well, I can certainly contest this interpretation of my action, perhaps 
divesting myself of the belief that I am innocently playing with my dog, but pointing out that 
I am not so much bullying my dog as training her to be a well-behaved, obedient and 
eventually sociable animal. But let us say that, judging from the tone of my neighbour’s 
remarks, I interpret his action of interpretation as nothing more than an attempt on his part to 
shame me and make himself feel superior to me. In this case, I might feel I have license to 
ignore his interpretation of my act, especially if it has often been observed that, in his 
dealings with his fellows, he acts to belittle them. Let us also say that, having observed a 
great many of my neighbour’s speech acts over time, I have solid grounds for believing that 
he is somebody whose assertions in this case should not be taken seriously, because, for 
example, he continually propounds views about dogs that are contrary to those that I and 
others successfully rely upon. Well, given the ostensible character of this particular actor, I 
would do very well indeed to ignore his interpretation of my action, which is to say that I 
would do well not grant him any authority over the interpretation of what I am doing in my 
backyard with my dog.30 In sum, as an actor, I may be out there in my action such as this is 
                                                 
30 The position outlined here with regard to the “seriousness” of interpretations and the “authority” of 
interpreters is quite close to Robert Brandom’s neo-Hegelian account of “deontic scorekeeping” within 
recognitive communities. In particular, Brandom emphasizes the constraint our social practices impose upon us 
as we undertake commitments (beliefs and desires) and keep track of one another’s entitlements to these 
commitments according to the roles they play in complex patterns of inference. See Robert Brandom, Making It 
Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1994). For an accessible account of this position, see Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to 
Inferentialism (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 157-204. In the present essay, what I am 
calling the “seriousness” of an interpretation is a matter of its consistency with other accepted claims. 
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(multiply) interpreted by other actors. But these interpreting actors are also out there in their 
multiply interpretable actions, and in such a way that this impacts upon both the seriousness 
of their interpretations and the authority with which I invest them as interpreters. Indeed, as I 
noted, even the seriousness of my interpretation of my own act, along with the authority 
which other people grant me as an interpreter in particular matters, will depend upon how my 
general character is perceived through the lens of my habits of speech and action. If, for 
example, a number of my past actions have been taken to demonstrate a bullying character, 
how could I credibly give myself out to my neighbour as someone who is “merely training” 
his dog? 
 
The third claim involved in this account of expressive agency is that an action will count as 
mine insofar as both I and others are able to recognize me in that action. What is required 
here is a different understanding of what constitutes the “success conditions” of an action. On 
the common-sense model, the criterion for the success of an action is that the agent’s original 
intention, conceived of prior to the act, has been fulfilled. On the expressive account of 
agency, however, “success” requires that I “recognize” myself in my action in the same way 
that others recognize me. Indeed, it would be difficult to say that I have performed a 
particular act if nothing I do is recognized by me or by others as that act.31 As in the above 
example, when my wife convinces me that I’m not really doing what I thought I was doing 
(what I was conscious of intending to do, namely, innocently playing with my doing), I come 
to share with her the recognition that what I was really doing (and so what I really wanted to 
                                                                                                                                                        
“Authority”, on the other hand, is the intersubjective recognition of an interpreter as entitled to his or her 
interpretation, because of its seriousness, but also because of other factors related to the recognitive 
community’s perception of the interpreting agent’s ethical character. 
31 This point is clearly expressed by Pippin, “Agent and Deed”, 381-2. 
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do) was trying to make my dog more obedient. In this case, my wife and I recognize that the 
action “trying to make Kiki more obedient” succeeds in expressing something about me as an 
agent. But if there is serious disagreement about what it is that I am doing, if those I invest 
with authority disagree about what I am doing, a specific action cannot be unambiguously 
attributed to me. And this situation creates a problem for me: it prevents my action from 
being “successful” and thereby diminishes my sense of autonomy. 
 
The final claim in this account of expressive agency is that the multiple interpretations and 
processes of reciprocal recognition just described take place in a shared expressive medium. 
This expressive medium is language, but language here, I would suggest, has to be taken in a 
very broad sense. It includes words, obviously, but also bodily gestures, background theories 
about the world and persons, and so on. Within this expressive medium or language, what we 
are all trying to do is indicate how things stand with ourselves and with each other in our 
various doings. What is crucial, moreover, is that the elements of this expressive medium are 
not given once and for all. Everyday language and a furrowed brow may be sufficient for my 
wife and I to recognize how it is that I am acting in the backyard with our dog. But in other, 
more complex intersubjective contexts, new words, gestures, theories, and so on, may need to 
be produced in order to creatively overcome the differences between how we and how others 
think about what we are collectively doing.32 
 
So, taking these four claims together, we can now recall what we set out to show, namely, 
that when it comes to explicating the philosophy of action and agency in The Logic of Sense, 
the Deleuzian notion of “willing the event” need not be understood as simply and directly 
                                                 
32 On the way in which, for Hegel, the gradual production of ever more complex “expressive media” allows for 
more refined understandings of our activity, see Taylor, “Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind”, 90-2. 
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willing some particular action. Indeed, we can now postulate that willing the event is 
inseparable from an expressive engagement with the sense-event taking place in our shared 
expressive medium: through the interpretation of actions, the contestation of these 
interpretations, the creation of new means of expression, and so on. As has just been shown, 
through our expressive engagement with the intersubjective dimension of the sense-event, we 
“make sense of” series of actions-events which are attributable to series of agents. Moreover, 
because this “expressive engagement” is itself a type of action, it will also be made sense of 
at the level of the sense-event. What “making sense of expressive activity” entails is that 
interpretations are invested with more or less “seriousness”, and the agents of expressive 
activity are invested with greater or less “authority”, with regard to the determination of the 
series of actions-events under consideration. On this account of expressive agency, then, an 
action can come to count as mine, not merely because I first will it and subsequently achieve 
what I intended to do; but because both I and others expressively produce the conditions in 
which we are able to recognize particular, determinate actions as expressing something about 
my intentions and thus about me as the agent of these particular actions. In other words, an 
action can come to count as mine – both in my eyes and in the eyes of others – insofar as my 
willing it is coordinate with my willing the sense-event which is taking place in our shared 
expressive medium, and which produces my determined actions, intentions, willings, and so 
on, as “effects”. 
 
This account of expressive agency thus promises to resolve the problem with which we 
began. On the one hand, it will allow us to retain the category of willing or intentions in order 
to distinguish between actions and mere occurrences; only now, the intentions which are said 
to lie behind our actions (including our expressive actions) will retrospectively appear as 
“effects” of the sense-event taking place in our shared expressive medium. On the other hand, 
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it will allow us to understand what Deleuze means by willing and taking responsibility for 
what happens, even as he maintains that the realm of events (whether actions or mere 
occurrences) is ontologically distinct from the realm of psychological or other corporeal 
causes. To sum up with a citation from Deleuze, for an action to be an action and to count as 
mine, it is not so much a question of me directly willing it as “attaining this will that the event 
creates in us; of becoming the quasi-cause of what is produced within us”.33 
 
3. Expressive agency in The Logic of Sense 
 
In outlining the idea of an expressive agency, I have not yet referred to the text of The Logic 
of Sense. This is primarily because Deleuze does not present or argue for such a conception in 
any detailed or systematic way. However, a number of crucial passages demonstrate that an 
expressive conception of agency is functioning, albeit mostly implicitly, in The Logic of 
Sense. So it is to an analysis of these passages that we must now turn. 
 
As mentioned in Section 1, in the “Twenty-First Series of the Event”, Deleuze asserts that 
one must exchange one’s corporeal or “organic will” for a “spiritual will [volonté 
spirituelle]”,34 and that it is the event itself – understood as a sense-event – that “creates in 
us” this spiritual will.35 As he proceeds to argue, this spiritual will 
 
wills now not exactly what occurs, but something in that which occurs, something yet 
to come which would be consistent with what occurs ... : the Event ... The event is not 
                                                 
33 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 148. 
34 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 149. 
35 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 148. 
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what occurs (an accident),  it is rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed ... [I]t 
is what must be understood, willed and represented in that which occurs.36 
 
Finally, Deleuze enjoins us “to become the offspring of one’s events and not of one’s actions, 
for the action is itself produced by the offspring of the event”.37 
 
What must firstly be acknowledged is that, in these passages (and particularly in the last 
passage cited), Deleuze is thinking of action as a type of incorporeal event as opposed to raw 
corporeal activity. Given that, as noted above, Deleuze makes a strict ontological distinction 
between the realm of bodies and causes and the realm of incorporeal events, he cannot be 
suggesting that an incorporeal event produces an “offspring” capable of corporeal activity. 
Indeed, incorporeal events have no causal efficacy whatsoever.38 
 
Following on from this point, the second thing to be understood is that action is not to be 
explained with reference to the prior psychological or brain states of an agent functioning as 
the causes of action. This is precisely what Deleuze means when he writes that the “organic 
will” must be exchanged for a “spiritual will”. Moreover, it appears that the notion of a 
“spiritual will” cannot be understood in isolation from the notions of the event and the 
expression of sense. As Deleuze puts it, the spiritual will is the will that “the event creates in 
us”. My suggestion is that the argument to be made here is that the spiritual will is 
inseparable from the incorporeal event which expresses it, as well as from the sense that is 
made of this event. If the incorporeal event in question is an action, we will thus say that the 
                                                 
36 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 149. 
37 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 150. 
38 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 7. 
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spiritual will is determined only as this action-event which expresses it is made sense of in 
the ideal, incorporeal and impersonal dimension of sense. In other words, by being made 
sense of in the intersubjective dimension of the sense-event, an action-event retrospectively 
reveals something about the agent of that action, such that we can say, with Deleuze, that the 
“action is produced by the offspring of the [sense-]event”. This, then, is an instantiation of the 
first element of my account of expressive agency: the agent with his or her intentions is not 
so much behind her actions as “out there” in her actions such as these are interpreted or made 
sense of in a shared expressive medium. 
 
The second claim involved in the above account of expressive agency is that while the 
actions of agents are multiply interpretable by others within a shared expressive medium, 
these others are also “out there” in their own multiply-interpretable actions. And it appears 
that Deleuze’s defends a claim of this kind in The Logic of Sense. In a striking passage in the 
“Twenty-Fifth Series of Univocity”, Deleuze writes that the individual – I would here like to 
say actor or agent – must  
 
grasp herself as an event; and … grasp the event actualized within her as another 
individual grafted on to her. In this case, she would not understand, will [voudrait], or 
represent this event without also understanding and willing [vouloir] all other events 
as individuals, and without representing all other individuals as events ... Counter-
actualizing each event, the actor-dancer extracts the pure event which communicates 
with all the others and returns to itself through all the others and with all the others.39 
                                                 
39 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 178-9 (translation modified). The notion of “representation” that Deleuze is 
employing here must be understood with reference to The Logic of Sense’s positive discussion of the “usage of 
representations” in Stoic philosophy (144-46), not with reference to the kind of representational thought that 
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This passage clearly indicates Deleuze’s understanding of the intersubjective and linguistic 
dimensions of action and agency. First of all, Deleuze asserts that the agent (individual, actor-
dancer, etc.) must “grasp herself as an event”, which is to say, must grasp herself as the 
“offspring” of the event. Or again, the agent must grasp herself as possessing a spiritual will 
which is inseparable from the representations or interpretations of the action-events 
expressing it. Secondly, the agent must understand the incorporeal action-events which 
express her will to be inseparable from other individuals or actors who are themselves events 
– which is to say, other agents whose willings are similarly inseparable from the multiply-
interpretable events expressing them. In other words, for Deleuze, the representation of an 
action, and hence the will, of a particular agent (actor-dancer), is inseparable from the 
representation of an entire series of “communicating” actions-events and their corresponding 
agents. What are these other, “communicating” actions-events? Although Deleuze does not 
specify, we can readily imagine that they include actions of three types. First of all, since 
representing is a kind of action, the series of communicating actions-events will obviously 
include, for want of a better word, acts of interpretation (as well as further interpretations of 
these interpretative acts). Secondly, since an isolated action of a particular individual only 
tends to make sense when viewed in relation to his general patterns of behaviour, or within a 
broader project or subsuming narrative, that isolated action should be thought of as 
“communicating” with various series of related actions-events, namely, those actions making 
up the ethical character and life-story of the particular individual concerned. Finally, since 
acts of interpretation are, as actions, “motivated”, any act of interpretation must be 
                                                                                                                                                        
Deleuze critiques elsewhere. See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Paul Patton (trans.) (London: 
Athlone, 1994), 131-8. 
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understood to be in communication with that series of interpreted actions constitutive of the 
ethical character of the interpreter. 
 
This brings us to the notions introduced in the previous section of the “seriousness” of 
interpretations and the “authority” of interpreters. It does not seem controversial to say that, 
for an interpretation or representation to be taken seriously or accepted, it must be consistent 
with other accepted claims. Similarly, it is uncontroversial to suggest that granting authority 
to an interpreter is a matter of granting him an entitlement to his interpretations, because of 
their seriousness, but also because of other factors related to his ethical character or perceived 
motivations. At face value, however, these points do not appear particularly “Deleuzian”, and 
readers will object that Deleuze would have no truck with words like seriousness and 
authority. Nevertheless, the argument can be made that these notions are of a piece with the 
discussion of “castration” in the Twenty-Ninth Series of The Logic of Sense. Indeed, in 
Deleuze’s description of the “dynamic genesis of sense”, “castration” names the process 
through which persons attain to the structural-symbolic dimension of language and culture, 
and thus effectively participate in the on-going determination of the sense-event taking place 
in this dimension.40 Indeed, Deleuze follows Lacan in understanding “castration” as both 
                                                 
40 On this point, see Bowden, Priority of Events, 221-7, 268-72. Although his overall focus is somewhat 
different, this is also Žižek’s reading of how the notion of castration functions in The Logic of Sense. As he 
writes, “is ‘symbolic castration’ not also the name for a process by means of which the child-subject enters the 
order of sense proper … ? So, far from tying us down to our bodily reality, ‘symbolic castration’ sustains our 
very ability to ‘transcend’ this reality and enter the space of immaterial Becoming … First, the impassive-sterile 
Event is cut off, extracted, from its virile, corporeal, causal base (if ‘castration’ means anything at all, it means 
this). Then, this flow of Sense-Event is constituted as an autonomous field of its own, the autonomy of the 
incorporeal symbolic order with regard to its corporeal embodiments”. See Slavoj Žižek, Organs without 
Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences (New York: Routledge, 2004), 74. 
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giving up the infantile desire to control the other’s desire, and positioning oneself within a 
symbolic structure of language and culture which organizes desire in a rule-like way. In other 
words, with respect to desire, castration involves an individual’s recognizing for the first time 
the “seriousness” of claims and the “authority” of claimants as inter-subjective rather than 
merely subjective phenomena, which is to say, as phenomena which are subject to normative 
assessment.41 
 
The third claim involved in the account of expressive agency presented in the previous 
section is that an action will count as mine insofar as both I and others are able to recognize 
me in that action. Again, the word “recognition” is clearly not part of the Deleuzian 
vocabulary. However, we can distinguish between recognition as correctly grasping a pre-
given identity (the type of recognition Deleuze critiques in Difference and Repetition),42 and 
recognition as the acknowledgement of a normative or social status, as when we recognize or 
acknowledge another person’s right to something even when there is no objective fact of the 
matter to which to refer. Indeed, it appears that this latter understanding of recognition is not 
incompatible with Deleuze’s just-mentioned discussion of the structural-symbolic dimension 
of language and culture. For to be “castrated” is simply to recognize and be recognized within 
the structural-symbolic dimension of language and culture, that is, to acknowledge and claim 
a series of social statuses which allows one to participate in the on-going production of the 
intersubjective sense-event. 
 
Now, as was argued in Section 2, reciprocal recognition is crucial to understanding the 
“success conditions” for action on an expressive account of agency. And indeed, Deleuze 
                                                 
41 On this, see Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 202-9. 
42 See Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 133-8. 
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appears to argue something similar in the appropriately titled “Twenty-Ninth Series – Good 
Intentions Are Inevitably Punished”. Avoiding the complex use of psychoanalytic vocabulary 
that Deleuze employs in this section of the text, we can see that he makes the following 
points.43 He first of all distinguishes between intended action, projected on what he calls a 
“physical surface” as an “image of action”, and accomplished action, which is projected on a 
“metaphysical” or “transcendental surface” – what we can call the surface of the on-going 
and intersubjective sense-event. He then goes on to say that the intended action is not really 
opposed to the accomplished action. Rather, each action is always-already divided in two. He 
writes: 
 
On one hand, the entire image of action is projected on a physical surface, where it 
appears as willed ... ; on the other, the entire result of the action is projected on a 
metaphysical surface, where the action appears as produced and not willed ... The 
famous mechanism of “denegation” (that’s not what I wanted …), with all its 
importance with respect to the formation of thought, must be interpreted as expressing 
the passage from one surface to the other.44 
 
We see here, then, an important confirmation of a Deleuzian conception of expressive 
agency. My intended action is, initially, the image I have of what I am purposefully doing. 
The accomplished action, on the other hand, is that which is reflected back to me, in our 
shared expressive medium, as “what I was really doing” and so “what I really wanted”. If 
both I and others come to agree on what it is that I am doing, reciprocal recognition will have 
been achieved and the action will, “for all intents and purposes”, count as mine. On the other 
                                                 
43 A detailed analysis of Deleuze’s relationship to psychoanalysis in The Logic of Sense can be found in 
Bowden, Priority of Events, Ch. 5. 
44 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 207-8. 
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hand, when there is serious disagreement about what it is I am doing, or when those I invest 
with authority disagree about what I am doing, reciprocal recognition has failed and a 
specific action cannot be unambiguously attributed to me. This situation, of course, upsets my 
sense of autonomy. It creates a problem for me – a problem that is neatly captured in the 
phrase “but that’s not what I wanted!” Nevertheless, what I am doing can still come to count 
as my action insofar as I am able to transform the difference between the intended action and 
the accomplished action into what Deleuze calls the “crack of thought”.45 What this means is 
that, when I encounter situations where there is disagreement about what it is that I am doing, 
I am driven to action at another level. That is to say that in order to overcome the difference 
between what I imagined I intended and what it turns out I intended, I am driven to creatively 
engage with the expressive element of the sense-event – that expressive element of “pure 
thought”, as Deleuze also calls it, from which all determined action is inseparable.46 Through 
such engagement, I hope to reconcile my and others’ perspectives on my action and thereby 
attain the will that the sense-event creates in me. 
 
The final claim involved in Section 2’s account of expressive agency is that the multiple 
interpretations and recognitive processes that determine actions-events and their agents take 
place in a shared expressive medium (or language) which is not already given or fixed but 
always coming about. But in fact, we have already seen that Deleuze defends a version of this 
                                                 
45 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 208. It is worth noting that the “crack of thought” is here understood as the 
sublimation of the “trace of castration”, recalling the suggestion made above that, for Deleuze, castration names 
the process through which persons come to effectively participate in the on-going and intersubjective 
determination of the sense-event. See Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 218-19. 
46 Deleuze calls the “metaphysical surface” – that dimension in which my action appears as produced and not 
willed – the “surface of pure thought”. See Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 208. The qualification “pure” signals that 
thought is here to be understood as impersonal, that is, irreducible to the thoughts of particular thinking persons. 
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thesis in The Logic of Sense. First of all, as was seen in Section 1, Deleuze argues that events 
in general only exist as the expressed or expressible sense of propositions. Moreover, sense 
must be produced, and always remains to be produced, by expressive activity, that is to say, 
by bringing language to bear on itself and even by creating new means of expression. The 
expression of sense, and hence the determination of an event, is thus always open to future, 
and indeed novel, language-events. This is precisely what Deleuze means when he writes that 
“language … is endlessly born, in the future direction of the Aion where it is established and, 
somehow, anticipated”, that is, insofar as its expressible sense is concerned; and what this 
language talks about is “the past of states of affairs which go on appearing and disappearing 
in the other direction”.47 Actions, then, being events, are interpreted and determined in an on-
going and open-ended way in a shared and fluid expressive medium. 
 
But it is also clear that the above-mentioned recognitive processes take place in this shared 
expressive medium. For the recognitive process is nothing other than the expressive and 
intersubjective attempt to reconcile first- and third-person perspectives on action and agency, 
through offering interpretations of the relations between communicating series of events, 
through the contestation of these interpretations, through the creation of new and more 
adequate means of expression, and so on. Through such expressive engagement or “willing” 
of the sense-event, we attempt to invest interpretations with more or less “seriousness”, and 
interpreters with greater or less “authority”. We thereby hope to determine, “for all intents 
and purposes”, exactly what it is we are doing. In other words, through our expressive 
engagement with the sense-event we attempt to achieve recognition, for ourselves and for 
others, of the “will” that the sense-event is creating in us. To do this is to become, not the 
direct cause of our actions, but their “quasi-cause”. 
                                                 





At the outset of this essay, it was observed that the collapse of a crucial distinction between 
actions and mere occurrences in Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense presented a problem for the 
philosophy of events advanced in this work. However, the account of expressive agency 
offered and subsequently identified in The Logic of Sense resolved this problem by viewing 
the intentional agent – the one responsible for actions – as an “effect” of the same general 
process of sense-making that applies to events in general. The intentional agent is determined 
when both the agent and others agree that a particular act-description succeeds in describing 
something about the agent of that action. Such agreement often happens as a matter of course. 
Indeed, in a great many cases, an agent and her recognitive community simply understand her 
actions in much the same ways. But in other cases, some type of “expressive engagement” 
will be required in order to achieve agreement about action and agency: the offering of new 
interpretations of the action in question, contesting such interpretations, making sense of what 
is said about the action, interpreting interpretative actions, creating new expressive tools, and 
so on. 
 
But now, if this Deleuzian account of expressive agency is cogent, it not only resolves a 
problem in The Logic of Sense, it also allows us to position Deleuze’s work in relation to 
contemporary debates about the nature of agency and action. In particular, this present study 
is suggestive of a number of connections that might be established between The Logic of 
Sense and contemporary work on expressive agency, carried out in relation to the thought of 
Hegel and Nietzsche by a number of thinkers cited above, including Charles Taylor, Robert 
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Pippin, Robert Brandom, Aaron Ridley and David Owen. I sincerely hope that it is not too 
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